Frankfurt, an American moral philosopher, attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the study of bullshit, which, in his words, is produced “whenever a person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic exceed his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 63, italics added). Similar in many ways to Max Black’s concept of humbug (quackery, nonsense or pretentious and deceptive misrepresentations that fall short of a lie), Frankfurt clearly takes a negative and pejorative view of what he calls bullshit. Unlike the liar who knows the truth yet chooses to deceive, the bullshitter ignores the truth and is, therefore, “a greater enemy of the truth than the liar” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 61).

Frankfurt’s book has struck a chord in our culture and with many people currently because there is, without doubt, a lot of Frankfurtian bullshit wherever one cares to look, read or listen. And we all do need to be far more reflective, cautious and circumspect when we express ourselves and our views in our fast-paced and fast-changing society, as well as professionally and in high stake situations, because of a pervasive “talking heads” environment and climate created by our own recent inventions. This aspect and dimension of the phenomenon, however, is not where we disagree with Frankfurt’s views or analysis. No, our disagreement is far deeper, and more fundamental and important in the long as opposed to the short run in our current instantaneous culture.

Although Frankfurt’s attempt to shed some light on this ubiquitous phenomenon is laudable, and his definition of bullshit reasonable and philosophically sound, his developing theoretical and conceptual view of bullshit has oppressive undertones and consequences, and is severely limited and outdated from a linguistic, cognitive science, and learning theory perspective—fields that have grown tremendously in the twenty years since Frankfurt’s article was first published. These fields have addressed many of the key features associated with what Frankfurt is calling bullshit. Because Frankfurt’s book has received positive attention and praise by some scholars and science educators (e.g., Good, 2005), many of whom are likely to embrace and operationalize these concepts, the gross limitations of this book (and the BS construct specifically) need to be identified and critically examined from a more contemporary perspective.

The purpose of this article, therefore, is to briefly address some of these shortcomings and to present a more informed and balanced treatment of Frankfurt’s interpretation of Bullshit (hereafter referred to as FIBS). Our aim here is to call attention to the severe limitations and implications of this popular academic book and to encourage all educational professionals to consider their own views of what Frankfurt defines as BS in relation to their own views of pedagogy, educational theory, and learning research. It is our opinion that many of the problems in education and educational research today are the result of weak and theoretically groundless attempts to address fundamental questions through outdated views and models of cognition versus more contemporary and main stream cognitive views (see Author, 2005). Frankfurt’s BS construct is a recent example of this “cognitive crisis” and problem in a philosophical guise.

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